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List of Parties

Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Rules of the Court of
Appeals, plaintiff represents that the names of all parties to
this appeal appear in the caption hereof.

The plaintiffs are
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question.

Since their interests are aligned, they will

collectively be referred to as "plaintiff".
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Statement of Jurisdiction and Nature
of the Proceedings Below
The Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A.

This appeal was "poured

over" to the Court Of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court by
notice of November 3, 1988.
In the proceedings below, the parties cross-moved for
summary judgment on the issue of whether an "earth movement"
exclusion in the subject insurance policy excluded plaintiff's
property loss.

The Lower Court found that that the exclusion

did apply, as a matter of law, thus granting defendant's motion
and denying plaintiff's motion.

Statement of Issue Presented For Review
The issue presented for review is an issue of law.
The parties agreed on the relevant facts.

The issue is

whether, as a matter of law, the "earth movement" exclusion in
the defendant's insurance policy applies to the property loss
sustained by plaintiff.
It is respectfully submitted that this is an issue of
first impression in this jurisdiction.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
The issue of law presented herein is determined by
case law, rather than statutory or constitutional law.

Statement of the Case
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals, plaintiff states the case as follows:
(i) Nature of the Case - This is an insurance
coverage case.

This is a first-party action (i.e. insured

against carrier) to determine whether there is coverage for
plaintiff's loss.

The loss at issue is a property loss, i.e.

structural damage to plaintiff's building.
(ii)

Course of Proceedings - This action seeking

determination of insurance coverage was filed in February
1987.

Defendant answered by claiming, inter alia, that its

insurance policy had an "earth movement" clause which excluded
coverage for plaintiffs loss.

After discovery, the parties

cross-moved for summary judgment on the issu€> of whether that
"earth movement" exclusion applied to plaintiff's loss.
(iii)

Disposition in the Court Below - The Lower

Court granted the defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, and
denied plaintiff's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment.

In other

words, the Lower Court found that the "earth movement"
exclusion did exclude coverage for plaintiff's loss, as a
matter of law.

This appeal followed.

If the Lower Court's Judgment were to be reversed,
defendant has a remaining defense to coverage that would

necessitate trial.

In this regard, plaintiff's Motion For

Summary Judgment below properly should have been designated a
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
(iv)

Statement of Relevant Facts - The relevant facts

were not contested, and were set forth in defendant's
Memorandum In Support Of Summary Judgment (R. 68) and
plaintiff's Memorandum In Support Of Cross-Motion For Summary
Judgment (R. 145) . A concise summary of the relevant facts
follows:
Plaintiff owns and operates the Village Inn Apartments
in Cedar City, Utah (R. 147). In 1986, plaintiff was insured
with defendant State Farm under an Apartment Policy (hereafter
"the policy," R. 81, relevant sections in Addendum hereto).
The policy generally provided plaintiff with property and
liability coverage (R. 69). The loss here was a property loss.
On or before February 24, 1986, an underground water
pipe ruptured on the premises of plaintiff's Village Inn
Apartments (R. 68). The escaping water saturated the soil
beneath, causing the soil to lose its weight-bearing ability.
The foundation settled almost 8 inches (R. 69). Estimated
costs of repair:

$70,000 (R. 147).

After the loss, Plaintiff submitted a claim to its
insurance carrier (defendant State Farm).

Defendant

investigated the claim, and ultimately denied same on the
ground, inter alia, of an "earth movement" exclusion in the
policy.

After the claim was denied, plaintiff brought this

action seeking a determination of coverage.
Summary of Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the Lower Court made an error of
law when it determined that the earth movement clause excluded
coverage for plaintiff's loss as a matter of law.

Plaintiff

argues that the earth movement clause is inapplicable to this
loss, as a matter of law.

There are three grounds for

plaintiff's argument.
First, the earth movement clause does not apply
because no earth movement occurred here.

In the policy, the

undefined phrase "earth movement" is followed by a string of
natural phenomenon and acts of God (e.g. earthquake, volcano,
landslide).

Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase

"earth movement" should be construed to mean natural forces
such as those mentioned, not "man-made" losses such as a pipe
break.
Second, the phrase "earth movement" can be construed
as ambiguous, because it is undefined and reasonably
suspectible of different meanings.

That ambiguity is strictly

construed against the carrier and in favor of coverage.

Third, to construe the earth movement exclusion as
applicable to this foundation-settling loss renders the policy
duplicative.
Argument
The defendant carrier has denied this claim on the
basis of an earth movement exclusion in the policy.

However,

the policy does not define the phrase "earth movement".
Therefore, the Court must construe that phrase.

Plaintiff

submits that the phrase could be construed in either of two
ways:

under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, or as ambiguous.

Under either construction, the result is the same:

the phrase

"earth movement" is deemed to apply only to natural forces and
natural phenomenon.

The majority of jurisdictions to construe

such exclusionary language have so ruled.
Before addressing the proper construction of the
phrase "earth movement", the burden of proof in the Lower Court
and the standard of review on this appeal will be set forth.
When an insurer denies a loss based upon an exclusion
in its policy, the insurer has the burden of proving by the
weight of the evidence that the loss falls within that cited
exclusion.

Whitlock v. Old American Insurance Company 442 P.2d

26, 21 Utah 2d 131 (Utah 1968).

The Lower Court determined

summarily that the defendant carried its burden of proving that

this loss fell within the earth movement exclusion.

On appeal,

this Court should not accord any particular deference to the
Lower Court's decision on this legal issue.

Since the Summary

Judgment was granted as a matter of law rather than fact, this
Court is free to reappraise the Trial Court's legal
conclusions.

Barber v. Farmers Insurance Exchange 751 P.2d 248

(Utah App. 1988) .
I.
IF THE PHRASE "EARTH MOVEMENT" IS CONSTRUED
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS, THE
EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS LOSS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The defendant carrier relied upon the "earth movement"
exclusion in the policy to deny coverage.

That earth movement

clause appears as 1f 3.b in the policy and excludes property

"caused by, resulting from, contributed to,
or aggravated by any of the following: (1)
earth movement, whether combined with water,
including but not limited to earthquake,
volcanic eruption, landslide, subsidence,
mudflow, sinkhole, erosion, or the sinking,
arising, shifting, expanding or contracting
of earth." (1f 3.b. of Policy, see p. 1)
Because the phrase "earth movement" is undefined, the
Court must construe the scope of that language.

Other Courts

faced with similar, undefined "earth movement" clauses have
applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to hold that the phrase
only applies to natural or geologic phenomenon.

_ £ _

In the exclusion, the phrase "earth movement" is an
undefined general phrase grouped together with more specific
terms.

Where general language is used together with specific

words, the familiar rule of construction known as ejusdem
generis ("of the same kind") requires that the general words be
restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words.

Fields

v. Mtn. States Tel, and Tel., 754 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1988),
Matter of Disconnection of Certain Territory 668 P.2d 544 (Utah
1983) .
This rule of construction, ejusdem generis, mandates
that the general term "earth movement" be restricted to the
specific surrounding terms (such as earthquake, volcano,
landslide, mudflow, rising and shifting of earth) which
contemplate natural or geologic forces.

Each of the recent

cases cited hereafter is a first-party action for property
coverage in which the Court, as a matter of law, construed the
phrase "earth movement" to apply only to natural forces or
natural phenomenon.
In United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. 709
P.2d 649 (N.M. 1985) an earthen dam failed.

The carrier denied

coverage on the grounds, inter alia, of the earth movement
exclusion.

The trial court construed the exclusion to apply to

"other naturally occurring phenomenon" in addition to the

"flood, earthquake, landslide [and] subsidence" cited in the
exclusion.

That construction was affirmed by the New Mexico

Supreme Court:
"In construing the term 'earth movement' to
cover only naturally occurring phenomenon,
the trial court applied the doctrine of
ejusdem generis. Numerous other cases have
applied the doctrine to the term 'earth
movement' [citations omitted] . . .
Therefore, we determine that the trial court
did not err in applying the doctrine of
ejusdem generis to the term 'earth movement'
and thereby finding that the exclusion in
the Allendale insurance policy did not apply
to the tailings dam spill . . . " Id. at
652-3.
In Holy Angels Academy v. Hartford Ins. Co., 487
NYS.2d 1005 (N.Y. 1985), a foundation settled due to nearby
construction work.

The carrier denied coverage on the basis of

the earth movement exclusion.

The parties cross-moved for

summary judgment on the issue of coverage.

The court granted

summary judgment for the insured, applying the doctrine of
ejusdem generis to construe the "earth movement" phrase as
restricted to natural phenomenon:
" . . .these words must be read in context
with those that surround them (ejusdem
generis) and, therefore, are limited in
application to natural phenomena . . . " Id.
at 1007.
In Henning Nelson Const. Co. v. Firemen's Fund, 383
N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1986) a foundation wall collapsed.

The

carrier denied coverage on the grounds, inter alia, of the
earth movement exclusion.

The lower court held the exclusion

inapplicable, construing the exclusion as relating only to
earth movement caused by widespread natural disaster.

The

Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed:
"The phrase 'any other earth movement' must
be construed within the context of the
exclusion as a whole and cannot be
artificially separated from the other
language [citation omitted]. Taken in this
manner, the earth movement exclusion must be
construed to apply to earth movements caused
by widespread natural disasters and not to
those caused by human forces." Id. at 653.
In Peters TP. School Dist. v. Hartford Indemnity Co.
833 F.2d 32 (Third Cir. 1987), a school sank after a mine
subsided.
exclusion.

The carrier denied coverage under the earth movement
The District Court construed the earth movement

clause to exclude property damage from natural causes such as
earthquake, landslides, and mudflows.

In upholding this

construction, the Third Circuit Court traced the historical
basis for construing earth movement exclusions to apply only to
natural phenomenon:
"We begin our review by noting that earth
movement exclusions in an insurance policy
generally refer to and have historically
related to catastrophic and extraordinary
calamity such as earthquakes and landslides
. . . We conclude, as did the District Court
. . . that the earth movement exclusion in
the policy was meant to deny coverage for

_Q__

spontaneous, natural, catastrophic earth
movement, and not movements brought about by
other causes." Id. at 35-6.
The Third Circuit Court in Peters found, as a matter of law,
that the carrier had failed to carry its burden of proving that
the loss fell within the earth movement exclusion.

Partial

summary judgment was granted the insured on the earth movement
exclusion.
Thus, numerous jurisdictions have recently construed
the language "earth movement" under the doctrine of ejusdem
generis to apply only to losses by natural forces and natural
phenomenon.

Ejusdem generis is a familiar rule of construction

in Utah as well, and "requires that the general words be
restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words".
of Disconnection, supra, at 548.

Matter

Therefore, the earth movement

exclusion should be construed to apply only to natural forces,
not "man-made" events such as a broken pipe.
II.
IF THE PHRASE "EARTH MOVEMENT" IS CONSTRUED
AS AMBIGUOUS, THE EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY
TO THIS LOSS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In construing the undefined "earth movement" language,
there is an alternative to the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
This Court could also construe the undefined phrase as
ambiguous.

-10-

In Utah, exclusionary language in an insurance policy
is ambiguous if the language can be reasonably understood by
the insured in a different manner than the carrier.

In Fuller

v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985) the issue was
whether a policy insuring an employer against "damages" covered
liability for out-of-state worker's compensation.

In finding

coverage, the Court observed that:

"At best, the meaning of the term as used in
the employer's [insurance policy] is
ambiguous. Plaintiff could have reasonably
understood these provisions to cover his
out-of-state worker's compensation liability
. . . Therefore, facially, these provision
afford coverage . . . " Id. at 1048.
Thus, under Fuller the critical question is whether an
insured could have reasonably understood the policy language in
a certain way.

If so, coverage exists, because "An insured is

entitled to the broadest protection he could have reasonably
understood to be provided by the policy."

Fuller, supra, at

1047.
The rule of Fuller was recently applied by this Court
in Metropolitan Property and Liability Ins. Co. v. Finlayson
751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988).

Metropolitan Property was a

declaratory judgment action to determine whether an insurance
policy exclusion applied to the insured's loss.

Specifically,

the carrier relied on a clause excluding coverage for
"non-owned automobiles" available for "regular use".

The lower

court granted summary judgment to the carrier, finding that the
clause excluded coverage for plaintiff's loss as a matter of
law.

On appeal, the insured argued that the undefined phrase

"regular use" was ambiguous.

This Court agreed:

"As previously stated, if the words used to
express the meaning and intention of the
parties may be understood to reach two or
more plausible meanings, the language is
ambiguous. We find either construction
presented by the parties plausible. Each
interpretation has some support in the case
law and in ordinary usage". Metropolitan
Property, supra, at 258.
Accordingly, the Metropolitan Property Court held that the
ambiguous phrase must be construed in favor of coverage, and
reversed the summary judgment of the lower court.
Defendant herein construes the phrase "earth movement"
to mean any physical displacement of soil.

Plaintiff herein

construes the phrase "earth movement" to mean movement caused
by natural forces or acts of God.

The issue is whether

plaintiff's construction is plausible.

That issue is to be

decided by reference to "ordinary usage" and case law.
Metropolitan Property, supra, at 258.
With regard to "ordinary usage", a reasonable layman
reading the language of this earth movement exclusion could

plausibly understand the clause to exclude coverage for natural
forces and acts of God.

The phrase "earth movement" itself is

immediately followed by phrases denoting natural forces and
natural disasters.

Furthermore, to determine ordinary usage

this Court can look to Webster's Dictionary, as it did in
Metropolitan Property, supra.

According to Webster, the

ordinary meaning of "earth movement" is a geologic or natural
force:
"Earth Movement - Geol. differential
movement of the earth's crust; elevation or
subsidence of the land, diastrophism;
faulting; folding . . . " Webster's New
Int'1 Dictionary, 2nd Ed. p. 809.
In addition to ordinary usage, this Court can look to
case law of sister jurisdictions in determining whether
insurance policy language is ambiguous.

See Metropolitan

Property, supra, at 257-8; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Alsop 709 P.2d
389 (Utah 1985).

Sister jurisdictions have found the phrase

"earth movement" ambiguous because laymen could plausibly
conclude that it referred to natural forces and natural
disasters.
This precise issue was decided in 1985 by the Court in
Holy Angels Academy, supra:
"Upon review, this Court finds that it is
not unreasonable for an ordinary individual
reading the policy language:
'Earth movement, including but not
limited to earthquake, landslide,

mudflow, earth sinking, earth rising or
shifting'
to conclude that this exclusion was designed
and intended to remove from coverage,
property damage occurring from such natural
causes as earthquakes, landslides and
mudflows . . . the policy holder is merely
limiting the exclusionary clauses to those
same general kind and class of perils as
enumerated in companion language. In so
holding we note, therefore, that [the
carrier] has not established that its
interpretation is the only one that can be
fairly applied to the policy language, and,
accordingly, we must resolve the ambiguity
in favor of the insured." Id. at 1007
In so holding, the Holy Angels Court noted that similar
exclusionary language had been the subject of judicial
interpretation in several jurisdictions, with only one Court
finding the language unambiguous.
Thus, ordinary usage and case law from sister
jurisdictions demonstrate that a layman could plausibly
understand the language "earth movement" to refer to natural
and geologic forces.

The defendant insurance company has a

different understanding of the language.

This renders the term

ambiguous, and that ambiguity is resolved against the carrier
and in favor of coverage.

Metropolitan Property, supra, at

258; Fuller, supra, at 1046.
III.
DEFENDANT'S CONSTRUCTION OF
THE PHRASE "EARTH MOVEMENT"
RENDERS THE POLICY DUPLICATIVE.

-14-

Defendant urges that the phrase "earth movement"
should be construed to apply to a foundation-settling loss such
as occurred here.

However, defendant's policy has an entirely

separate exclusion for foundation-settling.

See Exclusion I.e.

of the policy (Addendum, p. 2). If State Farm believed the
earth movement exclusion applied to foundation-settling losses,
it was superfluous to provide a separate exclusion for
foundation-settling.
A similar situation arose in Jones v. Saint Paul Ins.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 291 (Texas App. 1987).

In Jones, a foundation

settled as earth dried, causing a wall to collapse.

The

carrier denied coverage on the basis of the earth movement
exclusion and a foundation-settling exclusion.

The Jones Court

held the earth movement exclusion inapplicable as a matter of
law, for two reasons.

First, earth movement "contemplated

abnormally large movements such as the examples listed."
Second, it would be incongruous to construe the earth movement
exclusion to cover foundation-settling when the policy had a
separate exclusion for foundation-settling:
"A contract must be construed to give effect
to all its provisions, if possible, and a
construction will not be placed on one
provision if it causes another to be
meaningless [citations omitted]. Another
exclusion pled by [the carrier] was
settling, cracking, or other defect of
foundations. This 'settling' exclusion

_ 1 c;_

would be rendered meaningless by adopting
the construction of 'earth movement' urged
by [the carrier]." Id. at 297
Conclusion
Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the Lower Court
and hold that the policy's earth movement exclusion does not
apply

t0

plaintiff's loss, as a matter of law.

The result is

the same whether the undefined phrase "earth movement" is
construed under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, or as
ambiguous.
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ADDENDUM
Two Relevant Sections Of
State Farm Policy

ADDENDUM

p.1

SECTION I
LOSSES INSURED AND
LOSSES NOT INSURED (cont.)
ance of property, or shortage of

property

(2)

disclosed on taking inventory;

f l o o d , surface w a t e r , w a v e s , tidal w a ter or tidal w a v e s , o v e r f l o w of streams
or other bodies of w a t e r , or spray f r o m

i.

due to any delay or loss of m a r k e t ;

any of the f o r e g o i n g , all w h e t h e r driven
by w i n d or n o t ;

j.

caused by repeated leakage or seepage of
(3)

w a t e r or s t e a m w h e t h e r c o n t i n u o u s or interm i t t e n t f r o m any:
(1)

w a t e r w h i c h backs up t h r o u g h sewers
or drains;

(4)

heating, air c o n d i t i o n i n g or refrigerating

w a t e r b e l o w the surface of the ground
including that w h i c h exerts pressure on

system;

or f l o w s , seeps or leaks t h r o u g h side(2)

walks, driveways, foundations, walls,

d o m e s t i c appliance; or

b a s e m e n t or other floors, or t h r o u g h
(3)

or

d o o r s , w i n d o w s or any other opening

around any s h o w e r stall or other s h o w -

in such sidewalks, d r i v e w a y s , f o u n d a -

er bath installation, b a t h tub or other

t i o n s , walls or floors;

plumbing

system,

including

from

p l u m b i n g fixture.
unless fire or explosion as insured against
2.

ensues, and then the C o m p a n y shall be liable

The C o m p a n y does not insure for loss either c o n -

only for loss caused by the ensuing fire or

sisting of, or directly and i m m e d i a t e l y caused by

explosion. This exclusion shall not apply to

p o w e r , heating or cooling failure, or due to change

loss arising f r o m t h e f t ;

in t e m p e r a t u r e or h u m i d i t y , unless the failure or
change results f r o m physical d a m a g e t o the b u i l d ing or to e q u i p m e n t c o n t a i n e d therein caused by a

c.

hostile or warlike action in time of peace or
war, including action in hindering, c o m b a t i n g

Loss Insured. A l s o , the C o m p a n y shall not be liable

or d e f e n d i n g against an actual, i m p e n d i n g or

under this exclusion for any loss resulting f r o m

e x p e c t e d attack:

riot, riot a t t e n d i n g a strike, civil c o m m o t i o n , or
vandalism or malicious mischief.

(1)
3.

The C o m p a n y

does not

insure for

loss

(de jure or de facto), or by any authority

which

m a i n t a i n i n g or using military, naval or

w o u l d not have occurred in the absence of one or

air f o r c e s ;

m o r e of the f o l l o w i n g excluded e v e n t s . The C o m pany does not insure for such loss

regardless

of: a) the cause of the excluded e v e n t ; or b) other
causes of the loss; or c) w h e t h e r other

by any g o v e r n m e n t or sovereign power

causes

a c t e d concurrently or in any sequence w i t h the

(2)

by military, naval or air forces; or

(3)

by an agent of any such g o v e r n m e n t ,
p o w e r , authority or forces;

excluded event t o produce the loss:

it being u n d e r s t o o d that any discharge, exa.

occasioned directly or indirectly by enforce-

plosion or use of any w e a p o n of war e m p l o y -

m e n t of any ordinance or law regulating the

ing nuclear fission or fusion shall be c o n c l u -

c o n s t r u c t i o n , repair or d e m o l i t i o n of b u i l d -

sively

ings or s t r u c t u r e s ;

warlike action by such a g o v e r n m e n t , p o w e r ,

p r e s u m e d t o be such

a hostile

or

authority or forces;
b.

caused by, resulting f r o m , c o n t r i b u t e d t o , or
aggravated by any of the f o l l o w i n g :

d.

insurrection, rebellion, r e v o l u t i o n , civil w a r ,
usurped p o w e r , or action taken by g o v e r n -

(1)

earth

movement,

whether

combined

w i t h w a t e r or n o t , including but
l i m i t e d to e a r t h q u a k e , volcanic

not

erup-

m e n t a l authority in hindering, c o m b a t i n g or
defending

against

such

an

occurrence,

seizure or d e s t r u c t i o n under quarantine or

mudflow,

c u s t o m ' s regulations, confiscation by order

sinkhole, erosion, or the s i n k i n g , rising,

of any g o v e r n m e n t or public authority, or

s h i f t i n g , e x p a n d i n g , or c o n t r a c t i n g of

risks of c o n t r a b a n d nr ilipnal r r a n c n o r t ^ i ^ n

t i o n , landslide, subsidence,

ADDENDUM p . 2

SECTION!
LOSSES INSURED AND
LOSSES NOT INSURED
LOSSES
INSURED

(4)

rust, mold, wet or dry rot, contamination;

This policy insures for accidental direct physical loss
except as provided in SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED.

(5)

dampness or dryness of atmosphere,
changes in or extremes of temperature;

(6)

smog, smoke from agricultural smudging or industrial operations;

(7)

birds, vermin, rodents, insects or animals;

LOSSES NOT
INSURED
1.

The Company does not insure for loss either consisting of, or directly and immediately caused by,
one or more of the following:
a.

b.

caused by leakage or overflow from plumbing, heating, air conditioning or other equipment or appliances (except fire protective
systems) caused by freezing while the described building is vacant or unoccupied, unless the insured shall have exercised due diligence with respect to maintaining heat in the
buildings or unless such equipment and appliances have been drained and the water
supply shut off during such vacancy or unoccupancy;
caused by any electrical injury or disturbance
of electrical appliances, devices, fixtures, or
wiring caused by electrical currents artificially
generated unless fire as insured against ensues. The Company shall be liable only for
loss caused by the ensuing fire.

c.

caused by pilferage, appropriation or
concealment of any property covered or any
fraudulent, dishonest or criminal act done by
or at the instigation of any insured, partner or
joint venturer, including any officer, director,
trustee, employee or agent thereof, or any
person to whom the property covered may
be entrusted;

d.

caused by:
(1)

wear and tear, marring or scratching;

(2)

deterioration, inherent vice, latent defect;

(3)

mechanical breakdown of machines,
including rupture or bursting caused by
centrifugal force;

unless loss by fire, smoke (other than smoke
from agricultural smudging or industrial operations) explosion, collapse of a building,
glass breakage or water not otherwise excluded ensues. This poiicy shall cover only
such ensuing loss.
If loss by water not otherwise excluded ensues, this policy shall also cover the cost of
tearing out and replacing of any part of the
building covered required to effect repairs to
the plumbing, heating or air conditioning system or domestic appliance but excluding loss
to the svstem or appliance from which the
water escapes,
due tc any and all settling shrinking, cracking, bulging or expansion of driveways, sidewalks swimming pools, pavements, foundations, walls, floors, roofs or ceilings,
caused by explosion of steam boilers, steam
pipes, steam turbines or steam engines (except direct loss resulting from the explosion
of accumulated gases or unconsumed fuel
within the firebox, or combustion chamber of
any fired vessel or within the flues or passages which conduct the gases of combustion
therefrom) if owned by, leased by or operated under the control of the insured, or for any
ensuing loss except by fire or explosion not
otherwise excluded. The Company shall be
liable only for such ensuing loss;
due to voluntary parting with title or possession of any property by the insured or others
if inauced to ao so Dy any fraudulent scheme
or false pretense,
due [o unexplained or mysterious disappear-

